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School choice reform refers to changes that allow parents greater freedom 
to choose schools for their children. School choice reform is contentious 
because it fundamentally alters the environment in which public and 
private schools operate and could result in significant changes for both 
demanders and suppliers of education. This article develops a model of 
public education with imperfect exit to predict how private school 
enrollment influences performance of public schools. Empirical evidence 
from data on all private and public schools in California provides 
substantial support for the hypothesis that public school test scores are 
inversely related to private school enrollments and charter school 
enrollments when private and charter schooling reflects exiting by parents 
unhappy with local public schools. Implications regarding how expanded 
private school choice might influence public school performance in 
California and elsewhere are discussed. 
I. Introduction fundamentally alters the environment in which 
public and private schools operate and could result 
Proposals calling for school choice reform are often in significant changes for both demanders and 
attributed to Milton Friedman’s (1955) advocacy of suppliers of (public and private) education. 
tuition vouchers as a means of improving public and Opponents of expanded choice often fear that 
private schools. School choice reform refers to poorlyperforming public schools will lose quality 
changes that allow parents greater freedom to students as parents exercise greater opportunities to 
choose schools for their children. For example, transfer to other public schools or choose private 
vouchers or tax-preferences that subsidize tuition, schools. Such sorting is often termed ‘cream-skim­
books and transportation costs expand private school ming’ by opponents who predict that it lowers 
choice because they lower costs associated with peer group quality and public funding for public 
private schooling. Easing of restrictions that base schools losing students and fear that gaps between 
public school admission on housing location expands poor-quality and high-quality schools could widen. 
public school choice by widening numbers of public Proponents argue that public schools should 
schools to choose from. It is not surprising that worry about greater school choice only when 
school choice reform is contentious because it schools are perceived to be inferior to other public 
or private schools. Poor performance is considered 
likely according to proponents because lack of exit 
opportunities subjects public schools to little compe­
tition and therefore expanded opportunities for exit 
should create incentives for poor quality schools to 
improve or keep losing students and funding. As 
performance improves, performance gaps between 
schools might shrink. 
This article addresses the debate over expanded 
school choice by examining how private enrollments 
influence performance of public schools. Private 
schooling is clearly one option for parents unhappy 
with public schools and therefore private enrollments 
may inversely influence public school performance as 
long as private schools outperform public schools. 
This article examines data on all private and public 
schools in California in 2003 and concludes that, after 
controlling for other factors that might influence 
performance, public school performance is inversely 
related to private school enrollments. Implications 
regarding how expanded private school choice might 
influence future public school performance in 
California and elsewhere are discussed. 
II. Public Education with Imperfect Exit 
Public education programmes result from exchange 
between voters-demanders and policymakers-suppli­
ers and, as in private markets, exchanges may take 
place under different market structures. Public 
education markets may be competitive or monopo­
listic as influenced by the degree to which voter-
demanders have exit options over public programs 
they receive. Voters-demanders include parents, 
homeowners, and employers who all view quality 
education in one way or another linked to their 
interests. When parents conclude that local public 
schools are unable to deliver programs they desire, 
they may exit to preferred education programs along 
the lines outlined by Tiebout’s (1956) model of 
‘voting-with-your-feet’. Exiting behaviour may 
include transfers to other public schools, home 
schools or private schools. The Tiebout model 
predicts that citizens with similar interests tend to 
assemble in similar political jurisdiction which 
suggests that local residents will exhibit fairly uniform 
preferences for programmes such as public educa­
tion.1 Under certain conditions, Tiebout-type mobi­
lity within a system of many exit opportunities leads 
to a Pareto-efficient equilibrium.2 
Ability-to-exit a particular public school, however, 
is clearly imperfect and influenced by ease of transfer 
to other public schools and affordability and avail­
ability of local private schools. Parents are often 
assigned specific schools within their school districts 
and such ‘exclusive territories’ force parents to 
undertake costly relocation if they want different 
public schools, even though moves may be short 
distances.3 Tuition at private schools may also be 
prohibitive thus also lowering exit ability of some 
parents. Few exit options enable public schools to 
exhibit some degree of monopoly power. 
Financing public education through the ability-to­
pay principle may also contribute to lower school 
performance as parents with public school children 
may be less interested in monitoring quality than they 
would under the benefit principle of taxation. Tax 
bills of parents are not sensitive to numbers of school-
age children and probably lead to less concern over 
quality than would arise if tax bills rose with 
consumption. That is, taxpayers with school-age 
children do not face higher tax bills, at the margin, 
for sending children to public or private schools than 
taxpayers without school-age children. Moreover, 
because parents do not have abilities to quit paying 
for public education if they exit to private education, 
this financing system likely promotes less scrutiny of 
public school performance than would arise if they 
did not ‘pay twice’ for education when exiting to 
private schools. In contrast, parents purchasing 
private education face tuition bills directly related 
to numbers of children sent and therefore incentives 
arise for these parents to carefully monitor perfor­
mance because they have the ability to exit and no 
longer fund private education. 
This discussion suggests that private schools have 
greater incentives to provide superior performance 
over public schools because parents have choices 
about whether they will choose private schooling and 
pay tuition. Parents therefore have great financial 
incentives to monitor performance very closely when 
they choose to fund private schools. Average tuition 
in 1999 ranged from $3263 for Catholic schools to 
$19 992 for secular schools, with $4689 being the 
1Martinez-Vazquez and Seaman (1985) and Hamilton and Macauley (1991) find that, when communities with diverse
 
populations have relatively few school districts, there are more private schools. Evidence then suggests that private
 
enrollments are higher when public schools do not support diverse preferences and so greater numbers of private schools
 
provide more exit opportunities for demanders.
 
2 Assumptions include perfect information and mobility and absence of free riders and interjursidictional externalities.
 
3 See West (1990) for a discussion. There may also be some ability to petition to attend another public school.
 
average for all private schools.4 Evidence indicates 
that private schools consistently achieve higher rates 
of attendance and graduation, levels of parental 
satisfaction and college admission rates than public 
schools.5 However, added expense of tuition clearly 
places private schools at a price disadvantage that 
contributes to the fact that private schooling com­
mands only about 10% of primary and secondary 
education in the United States. Proponents of 
expanded school choice predict that greater exit 
opportunities would lead to greater threats of 
exodus out of public education if public schools fail 
to respond to heightened competitive pressures by 
improving performance. 
The National Education Association (NEA), which 
is the largest teachers’ organization with 2.7 million 
members, holds an opposing view. This view focuses 
on improving public education by raising salaries, 
numbers of teachers and other conventional inputs in 
the production of education. NEA’s opposition to 
expanded school choice is clear: 
Teachers, parents, and the general public have long 
opposed private school tuition vouchers — especially 
when funds for vouchers compete with funds for overall 
improvements in America’s public schools. NEA and its 
affiliates have been leaders in the fight to improve 
public schools — and oppose alternatives that divert 
attention, energy, and resources from efforts to reduce 
class size, enhance teacher quality, and provide every 
student with books, computers, and safe and orderly 
6schools. 
NEA appears to equate quality with inputs and 
predicts that expanded school choice lowers public 
education quality whenever it leads to less public 
funding. While this view is consistent with the 
Tiebout-model prediction that expanded private 
school choice raises flight to private schools, appar­
ently ‘voting-with-your-feet’ is not considered a 
viable method for improvement due to fears of 
4 See National Center for Education Statistics (2002). 
5 
funding reduction and/or that exiting will be under­
taken mostly by higher-aptitude students or higher-
income families.7 
This discussion leads to the hypothesis that when 
private schooling reflects exiting by parents unhappy 
with local public schools, relatively high private 
enrollments reflect greater dissatisfaction with local 
public schools. Public school performance should 
then be inversely related to private enrollments based 
on the view that parents choosing private education 
are sensitive to public school quality as reflected in 
such measures as test scores. Empirical evidence that 
private enrollments are inversely related to public 
school performance then indicates that public schools 
lose quality students to private schools under the 
assumption that parents choosing private education 
are more interested in higher quality education. Of 
course, there are many possible factors that might 
explain why parents perceive private education to be 
worth tuition payments and include better peer 
groups, more interested parents, and/or greater 
incentives to produce higher quality product follow­
ing our previous discussion on why private schools 
may out-perform public schools. 
According to proponents of expanded school 
choice, this negative relationship may eventually 
disappear if public schools respond by raising 
performance to levels that counter exodus of better 
students. In this case, no relation between private 
enrollments and public school performance should 
appear. Otherwise, a negative relation is consistent 
with the view that private schools provide perfor­
mance that is sufficiently above public schools to lead 
to relatively high private enrollments. Stated differ­
ently, public schools are expected to exhibit higher 
test scores in communities with relatively low private 
enrollments because such communities have relatively 
little demand for private schools because their public 
schools offer relatively high performance. 
See, for example, Alt and Peter (2003). However, it should be noted, that Coleman et al. (1966), or the so-called Coleman 
Report, concluded that the strongest predictor of student performance was family background as, for example, measured by 
household income and parental socio-economic status. Therefore, conventional measures such as per pupil spending and 
student-to-teacher ratios were found to be relatively unimportant in most cases. This report prompted numerous studies that 
mostly supported the original findings of the Coleman Report as discussed in Hanushek’s (1986) extensive survey of the 
literature. More recently, others have argued that school effects such as per pupil funding are more important than previously 
believed. See, for example, Card and Krueger (1992) and Hedges et al. (1994). Several researchers doubt the validity of recent 
studies concluding that school effects are important; see, for example, Betts (1995), Grogger (1996) and Hanushek et al. 
(1996). While debate continues on how important school effects are, most researchers appear to agree that nonschool effects 
such as family and community background are quite important when it comes to determining student performance. 
Therefore, perhaps school effects are less important as well than nonschool effects in explaining student performance 
differences between private and public schools.’’ 
6 Quote taken off http://www.nea.org/vouchers/index.html during December 2005. 
7 The following quote from NEA’s website http://www.nea.org/vouchers/index.html during December 2005 makes it clear 
that they view vouchers as a threat to poorly-performing public schools: ‘NEA and its affiliates support direct efforts to 
improve public schools. There is no need to set up new threats to schools for not performing. What is needed is help for the 
students, teachers, and schools who are struggling.’ 
III. School Choice in California 
California provides a large data set to examine how 
private enrollments are related to public school 
performance. California enrolls roughly 13% of all 
public primary and secondary students in the 
nation.8 There are more than 6 million public 
school students (primary and secondary education) 
served by about 9000 public schools in over 1000 
public school districts. There are roughly 600 000 
private school students served by 3700 private 
schools. The private share of all education in 
California then is roughly 9%and is consistent 
with the national average.9 
California Department of Education publishes 
data on many aspects of private schools.10 All 
private schools serving elementary or high school 
students, and who enroll at least six students, are 
required to file an affidavit or statement each year 
with the State Superintendent of Public Instruction. 
A summary of selected information for the 
2003�2004 school year follows. Students in private 
schools accounted for 9% of 2003�2004 enroll­
ments in all public and private schools. Of the 
599 605 private school students, 450 274 were 
enrolled in elementary grades (K-8) and 149 331 
were enrolled in secondary grades (9�12). Sixty-
four percent of students enrolled in private schools 
attended church-affiliated (religious) schools, with 
Roman Catholic schools accounting for 39% of the 
total number of church-affiliated schools and 
serving 59% of students attending such schools. 
The data exhibit wide variation in shares of 
students in private school enrollments and between 
counties thus indicating substantial range of private 
school choice.11 The average (median) share of 
students enrolled in private schools as a percentage 
of all enrollments is 6.2% (5.1%), with a range of 
0�29.1%. The average (median) share of students 
enrolled in religious schools as a percentage of all 
enrollments is 5.0% (4.4%), with a range of 
0�22%. The average (median) share of students 
enrolled in Catholic schools as a percentage of all 
enrollments is 2.1% (1.4%), with a range of 
0�17%. Finally, the average (median) share of 
8 Data from Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2003. 
9 
students enrolled in secular schools as a percentage 
of all enrollments is 1.1% (0.4%), with a range of 
0�8.8%. Data indicate that a majority of private 
school enrollments are in religious schools, with 
roughly 40% of those enrollments in Catholic 
schools. 
Two propositions that would have allowed vou­
chers in California were defeated in recent years.12 
Proposition 174 in 1993 would have amended the 
state constitution to provide vouchers for families to 
enroll their children in public, private or parochial 
schools. In 2000, Proposition 38, a voter initiative to 
provide parents, regardless of income, with universal 
vouchers worth $4000 per child for use at any public 
or private school, was also defeated. 
Private and public school choices may also be 
expanded through tax preferences. The federal 
government offers education savings accounts such 
as the Coverdell Educations Savings Accounts that 
enable parents to save up to $2000 annually in bank 
accounts that are free from taxation and to apply this 
money to K–16 educational expenses. Various states 
allow tax credits and deductions for certain educa­
tional expenses such as private school tuition, books 
and transportation, but California does not offer 
similar tax-preferences. 
While California does not directly subsidize 
private school choice through vouchers or tax-
preferences, recent developments have expanded 
public school choice. In 1992, the Charter School 
Act was passed (amended in 1998, 1999, 2002 and 
2003) and currently permits establishment of 650 
charter schools and raises the cap by 100 schools 
for each subsequent academic year. Local school 
boards, county boards of education and the 
California State Board of Education may authorize 
charters and these schools receive 100% of public 
schools’ per-pupil funding. Teachers in charter 
schools are required to be certified. In 2003, there 
were 154 365 students enrolled in 443 charter 
schools. 
Two California bills passed in 1993 � Assembly 
Bill 1114 and A.B. 19 � give parents rights to 
transfer children to other public schools within and 
outside their district, subject to space limitations or 
In 1999–2000, approximately 27 000 private schools, with 404 000 full-time-equivalent (FTE) teachers, enrolled 5.3 million 
students. These schools accounted for 24% of all schools in the United States, 10% of all students, and 12% of all FTE 
teachers; see US Department of Education (2002). 
10 Numbers discussed here are from California Department of Education (2004). 
11 Counties having 10% or more of their total students enrolled in private schools in 2003�2004 were: Alameda (11.8%), 
Contra Costa (10.3%), Los Angeles (10.5%), Marin (18.7%), Napa (13.4%), Orange (10.1%), San Francisco (29.1%), San 
Mateo (15.4%), Santa Clara (12.4%) and Santa Cruz (11.2%). 
12 These defeats are consistent with Kenny’s (2005) discussion of initiatives that concludes that voucher bills have been passed 
only in the more conservative Republican states. 
racial balance policies. Successful transfer may have 
previously required residential relocation. These 
mandatory intradistrict choice laws enable parents 
to choose from schools within their district of 
residence. Interdistrict transfers are limited to 
districts that elect to participate. Unfortunately, it 
is unclear how California fits into national trends 
because the California Department of Education 
does not report how many parents elect public 
school choice. But, the US Department of 
Education (2003) reports that 14% of students 
attended a public school of choice in 1999 and the 
trend away from public, assigned school enrollment 
and toward public, chosen school enrollment 
between 1993 and 1999 was most evident in low-
income households. Under the 2002 federal No 
Child Left Behind Act, children attending schools 
that have failed to make adequate yearly progress 
toward meeting state standards for two consecutive 
years are eligible to transfer to better-performing 
schools within their district. 
In sum, California does not facilitate private school 
choice through vouchers or tax-preferences, but 
public school choice is fostered to the extent that 
parents can take advantage of mandatory intradis­
trict and voluntary interdistrict transfers laws. It 
remains unclear how easy it is for parents to exercise 
public school choice because enrollments are depen­
dent upon space limitation and racial balance policies 
and no data are reported on these transfers. This is 
unfortunate because private enrollments are likely to 
be related to both ease of intradistrict and interdis­
trict transfer and to perceived quality gaps between 
high- and low-performing schools. Data on location 
and frequency by which transfers occur might reveal 
much about parental preferences regarding public 
school choice as well as how it influences private 
enrollments. 
Ease of public school choice should be related to 
numbers of school districts within counties because 
choice should rise with numbers of school districts 
when local policies affecting school quality are made 
at the level of school districts. The Herfindahl index, 
or the sum of squared shares of school district 
enrollments within counties, then measures ease of 
transfer from one district to another and controls for 
influences of public school choice on private enroll­
ments. Greater public transfer options, as measured 
by Herfindahl scores, is hypothesized to lower private 
enrollments when greater public school choice lessens 
need for parents to exit public schools for private 
schools. 
IV. Modelling Effects of Private 
Enrollments on Public School 
Performance 
Endogeneity is an issue of concern if the causal 
relationship between public school performance and 
private school enrollment is two-way. One possible 
direction is that public school performance causes 
private school enrollment as, for instance, high-test 
scores in public schools cause private enrollments to 
be relatively low. But, private school enrollment 
could also cause public school performance when, for 
instance, better students exit to private schools thus 
causing public school scores to fall. Disentanglement 
of these causal effects is a critical issue when we 
examine influences of private enrollments on public 
school performance. Possibility of two-way causality 
is addressed here by using two-stage least squares to 
estimate models of public school performance. 
Ordinary least squares produces biased and incon­
sistent estimates of coefficients in presence of 
simultaneity. Also, to control for possibility of 
differential variance by county size, equations are 
estimated with SEs and variances that use White’s 
(1980) covariance estimator. Estimates of coefficient 
covariances are calculated in presence of heteroske­
dasticity of unknown form. 
The model of public school performance in (1) is 
estimated by two-stage least squares, where 57 
counties in 2003 are the unit of observation. All 
California counties are included except Alpine which 
is excluded because of missing data.13 Cross-county 
estimation is appropriate because school districts are 
organized within counties in California and overseen 
by county boards of education, all of which are 
elected except for Los Angeles County’s board which 
is appointed by its Board of Supervisors. 
SCOREi ¼ f(INCOMEi, DENSITYi, TAKEi, 
SPENDi, HERFi, PRIVATEi, LEARNERSi, 
CHARTERSi) (1) 
The first-stage equation is 
PRIVATEi ¼ f(INCOMEi, DENSITYi, TAKEi, 
SPENDi, HERFi, HISPi, ASIANi, BLACKi, 
LEARNERSi, CHARTERSi) (2) 
Variables are defined along with summary statistics 
in Table 1. Data were collected from the California 
Department of Education website to measure and 
calculate all education-related variables. Income 
(INCOMEi), and population density (DENSITYi) 
13 Alpine County had a total public school enrollment of only 148 in 2003. 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
Mean Median SD Range 
MSAT ¼math SAT score 515.5 517.0 29.4 454�571 
VSAT ¼ verbal SAT score 502.8 5.08.0 29.1 449�567 
TSAT ¼math þ verbal SAT scores 
INCOME ¼ per capita personal income 
1018.4 
29 456 
1022.0 
25 781 
56.9 
9481.4 
903�1138 
18 893�65 642 
DENSITY ¼ population per square mile 375.4 99.3 720.5 1.8�3393.3 
TAKE ¼% of 12th graders taking SAT tests 30.5 30.4 9.7 14.4�59.1 
SPEND ¼ expenditures per public school student 7307 6935 875 5927�10216 
CATHOLIC ¼% of students in Catholic schools 2.1 1.4 2.7 0.0�17.0 
RELIGIOUS ¼% of students in religious schools 5.0 4.4 3.5 0�22.0 
SECULAR ¼% of students in secular schools 1.1 0.4 1.7 0�8.8 
PRIVATE ¼% of students in private schools 6.2 5.1 4.9 0�29.1 
HERF ¼Herfindahl index of public schools 2931 1788 2828 567�10 000 
HISP ¼ share of public school students of Hispanic origin 0.3 0.3 0.2 0�0.85 
ASIAN ¼ share of public school students of Asian origin 0.05 0.02 0.07 0�0.4 
BLACK ¼ share of public school students that are African-American 0.04 0.02 0.05 0�0.20 
CHARTERS ¼ share of students in charter schools 3.92 1.97 5.52 0�21.2 
variables were collected from the California 
Statistical Abstract, 2004. 
The dependent variable in (1) is SCOREi and refers 
to two public school test scores: SAT verbal and SAT 
math scores. Higher values indicate higher perfor­
mance and these measures are consistent with those 
used in other studies.14 Maximum scores of separate 
verbal and math SATs are 800. 
INCOMEi controls for influence of income on test 
scores based on the hypothesis that higher incomes 
raise demand for quality in public education. This 
hypothesized effect is consistent with the view that 
parents prefer quality education. Also public school 
quality is a critical component of local property 
values and, because income is probably highly 
correlated with property values, income is hypothe­
sized to exert a positive influence. It is common to 
include education attainment in the community as 
another factor influencing school performance, but it 
is not included here because of high correlation with 
income.15 
DENSITYi measures population density as defined 
by population divided by square miles and controls 
for differences that might arise between urban and 
rural counties. It is often argued that urban schools 
experience greater scale economies than rural schools 
thus allowing for greater performance from a given 
budget. However, urban schools may also suffer 
many social ills often associated with inner cities thus 
suggesting that greater density may exert an inverse 
14 
influence as well. The net effect of these influences is 
an empirical issue. 
Percentage of 12th grade students taking SAT 
exams (TAKEi) controls for the expectation that 
higher values result in lower test scores because 
higher percentages indicate, at the margin, lower 
aptitude students are taking tests. Larger percentages 
therefore are hypothesized to indicate that more 
lower-aptitude students take tests thus exerting 
downward pressure on average test scores. 
Public school spending SPENDi controls for effects 
on test scores that arise from differences in spending 
across counties. Spending is measured as spending 
per student in ‘average daily attendance.’ While 
conventional wisdom appears to be that higher 
spending leads to higher performance, the often-
cited review of the literature by Hanushek (1986) 
suggests that this relationship is weak at best. 
The Herfindahl score HERFi is expected to exert a 
negative effect on test scores based on the hypothesis 
that fewer public school choice options should 
negatively influence public school performance. As 
discussed, larger Herfindahl scores indicate fewer 
inter-district transfer options thus indicating fewer 
exit options, or simply less public school choice. 
Borland and Howsen (1992), Blair and Staley (1995), 
Zanzig (1997) and Marlow (2000) find that 
Herfindahl indices exert competitive pressures on 
public school performance. The Herfindahl index is 
the sum of squared shares in each market and 
For instance, see the review of more than 35 studies assessing public school performance in Belfield and Levin (2001). Also, 
Lankford and Wyckoff (1992) find that parents are sensitive to school quality as measured by test scores of public and private 
elementary schools. 
15 Educational attainment is measured by the percentage of adults over the age of 25 with at least a bachelor’s degree in 2000 
and is published in the Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2003. Results did not change when educational attainment 
was substituted for income. 
Table 2. 2SLS Estimates of catholic enrollments on public school performance estimated 
coefficients (t-statistics in parentheses) 
Cath03 Math03 Verbal03 
Dependent variable 1st Stage 2nd Stage 2nd Stage 
INCOME 0.0002* 0.003* 0.004* 
5.79 3.28 4.38 
DENSITY 0.0003 0.013** 0.011** 
0.56 2.56 1.90 
TAKE �0.069** �1.010 �1.126 
2.06 1.38 1.29 
SPEND 0.0003*** 0.002 0.007 
1.84 0.29 1.29 
CATHOLIC �4.230*** �10.673* 
1.81 3.43 
HERF 0.0001 �0.0004 �0.001 
1.38 0.36 0.05 
HISPANIC 2.821 
0.97 
ASIAN 15.805*** 
1.98 
AFRICAN 6.957 
1.33 
CHARTERS �0.057** �1.254** �1.293** 
2.10 2.21 2.07 
LEARNERS 0.845 �127.794* �110.152* 
0.16 4.89 4.41 
CONSTANT �6.038* 476.224* 487.14* 
2.90 12.35 4.76 
R2 0.76 
N 57 57 57 
F 19.14 
MEAN DEP. VARIABLE 2.09 515.53 502.84 
Note: *, ** and *** significant (two-tailed test) at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively 
therefore has a minimum value of near 0 and a 
maximum value of 10 000. Lower values indicate 
competitive markets and, at the extreme value of 
10 000, a perfect monopoly district that controls all 
public education in that county. 
PRIVATEi measures private school enrollments as 
percentages of all (private and public) students in 
each county. Previous discussion hypothesized that 
greater private school choice leads to lower public 
school test scores when public schools are considered 
inferior to private schools. Four measures of private 
school choice are examined: enrollments at Catholic, 
religious, secular and all or combined schools. It is 
possible that religious school enrollments, and 
especially those of Catholic schools, exert competitive 
pressures on public schools that differ from those 
from secular schools. Religious enrollments tend to 
offer subsidized tuition to a large segment of students 
as well as religious instruction that may not directly 
raise performance on standardized tests. Secular 
schools generally charge higher tuition and are 
‘college-prep’ in nature and so may cater more to 
higher-aptitude students than do religious schools. 
Each of three private school enrollments are con­
sidered separately and then combined to examine 
whether each exerts different influences on public 
school test scores. 
CHARTERSi is defined as the share of all county 
students attending charter schools in 2003 and is 
calculated from data on the California Education 
Department’s website. Charters schools provide 
parents with another means of avoiding more 
traditional public schools and therefore it is hypothe­
sized that a negative sign would indicate greater 
charter school choice leads to lower public school test 
scores when traditional public schools are considered 
inferior to private schools. 
Percentage of all students that are classified as 
English-learners LEARNERSi is hypothesized to 
exert a negative influence on test scores based on 
the conventional view that their lack of fluency places 
them at a disadvantage. 
Table 3. 2SLS estimates of religious enrollments on public 
school performance estimated coefficients (t-statistics in 
parentheses) 
Relig03 Math03 Verbal03 
Dependent 
variable 1st Stage 2nd Stage 2nd Stage 
INCOME 0.0003* 0.004* 0.006** INCOME 0.0002* 0.004** 0.006** 
5.08 2.69 2.50 5.21 2.15 3.01 
DENSITY 0.001*** 0.022** 0.024*** DENSITY �0.001 0.009** 0.001 
1.77 2.67 1.78 0.45 2.43 0.18 
TAKE �0.125** �1.619 �2.123 TAKE �0.033 �1.075 �1.331 
2.31 1.43 1.47 1.58 1.21 1.55 
SPEND �0002 �0.003 �0.002 SPEND 0.0004** 0.004 0.013** 
0.81 0.39 0.24 2.37 0.64 2.22 
RELIG �7.805*** �14.765** SEC �10.307 �27.448** 
1.85 2.13 1.10 2.43 
HERF 0.0002 0.0001 0.001 HERF �0.0002 �0.001 �0.002 
1.43 0.30 0.53 0.44 1.10 1.47 
HISPANIC 2.449 HISPANIC 2.546 
0.58 1.38 
ASIAN 10.354 ASIAN 6.285** 
1.27 2.04 
AFRICAN 9.039*** AFRICAN 0.600 
1.64 0.21 
CHARTERS 0.008 �0.551 CHARTERS �0.028 �1.320** �1.505** 
0.21 0.60 1.38 2.16 2.36 
LEARNERS �0.922 �122.889* �112.594*** LEARNERS �2.788 �130.988* �116.064** 
0.11 2.86 1.84 0.85 3.51 2.03 
CONSTANT �0.716 504.429* 478.965* CONSTANT �6.227* 438.704* 312.160* 
0.24 11.74 9.05 3.79 6.68 4.16 
R2 0.75 R2 0.79 
N 57 57 57 N 57 57 57 
7F 17.59 F 21.43 
MEAN DEP. 5.04 515.53 502.84 MEAN DEP. 1.15 515.53 502.84 
VARIABLE VARIABLE 
Note: *, ** and *** significant (two-tailed test) at 1, 5 and 
10% levels, respectively 
Instruments for first-stage estimation in (2) are all 
independent variables in (1) except PRIVATEi and 
the addition of HISPi (share of public school 
population of Hispanic origin), ASIANi (share of 
public school population of Asian origin) and 
BLACKi (share of public school population of 
African�American origin). Previous studies have 
shown that private school enrollments are higher in 
areas of higher income and those with stronger 
religious preferences.16 Downes and Greenstein 
(1996) examine location choice of California private 
schools in 1978�1979 and conclude that locational 
choice is influenced by local demographics and 
ethnicity. Shares of public school populations that 
are of Hispanic, Asian and African�American origin 
are included to control for ethnic composition. 
Table 4. 2SLS estimates of secular enrollments on public 
school performance estimated coefficients (t-statistics in 
parentheses) 
Sec03 Math03 Verbal03 
Dependent 
Variable 1st Stage 2nd Stage 2nd Stage 
Note: *, ** and *** significant (two-tailed test) at 1, 5 and 
10% levels, respectively 
Ethnicity was excluded from the second-stage educa­
tion outcome equations because studies have sug­
gested that English fluency is more important than 
ethnicity in explaining educational outcomes.17 High 
correlation between fluency and ethnicity would 
likely lead to multicollinearity and therefore inflated 
SEs as well. 
V. Estimation Results 
Four sets of estimations are discussed with each 
containing a different measurement of private school 
enrollment. Only relationships found to be statisti­
cally significant are discussed. Table 2 displays results 
16 See, for example, Hamilton and Macauley (1991) and Schmidt (1992). 
17 See, for example, Peng and Hill (1995) and Demie (2001). 
Table 5. 2SLS estimates of (total) private enrollments on 
public school performance estimated coefficients (t-statistics 
in parentheses) 
Sec03 Math03 Verbal03 
Dependent 
variable 1st Stage 2nd Stage 2nd Stage 
INCOME 0.0005* 0.004* 0.006* 
8.40 2.71 2.81 
DENSITY 0.001 0.018* 0.018*** 
1.12 2.86 1.76 
TAKE �0.158* �1.469 �1.948 
2.73 1.42 1.63 
SPEND 0.0001 0.0001 0.003 
0.31 0.02 0.53 
PRIVATE �5.051*** �10.336** 
1.74 2.27 
HERF 0.002 �0.007 0.001 
1.27 0.05 0.22 
HISPANIC 4.995 
1.12 
ASIAN 16.640*** 
1.66 
AFRICAN 9.639 
1.37 
CHARTERS �0.019 �1.114*** �0.898 
0.46 1.91 �1.23 
LEARNERS �3.711 �123.636* �110.501*** 
0.44 3.03 1.93 
CONSTANT �6.943*** 473.681* 417.697* 
1.97 11.54 9.29 
R2 0.83 
N 57 57 57 
F 27.33 
MEAN DEP. 6.19 515.53 502.84 
VARIABLE 
Note: *, ** and *** significant (two-tailed test) at 1, 5 and 
10%levels, respectively 
for Catholic school enrollments. The first-stage 
regression indicates that enrollments are positively 
influenced by income, shares of students of Asian 
origin and public school spending. Percentages of 
students in charter schools and taking SAT exams 
exert negative effects. Second-stage regressions are 
displayed separately for verbal SAT and math SAT 
scores. Income exerts hypothesized positive influences 
on all test scores. More densely populated counties 
are found to exhibit higher math and verbal SAT 
scores. Catholic school enrollments exert negative 
effects on all test scores thus supporting the hypoth­
esis that areas with greater private (Catholic) school 
enrollment also have relatively lower public school 
performance. Charter enrollments and percentages of 
students who are English-learners exert hypothesized 
negative influences on both test scores. 
Table 3 displays results for all religious school 
enrollments. The first-stage regression indicates that 
enrollments are positively influenced by income, 
population density and shares of students of 
African descent. Percentage of test-takers exerts a 
negative influence. Second-stage regressions show 
that income and population density exert hypothe­
sized positive influences on both test scores. Religious 
school enrollments exert negative effects on both test 
scores thus indicating that areas with greater private 
(religious) school enrollment also have relatively 
lower public school performance. Percentages of 
English-learners exert negative influences on both 
test scores. 
Table 4 displays results for secular school enroll­
ments. The first-stage regression indicates that 
enrollments are positively influenced by income, 
public school spending and shares of students of 
Asian descent. Second-stage regressions show that 
income exerts hypothesized positive influences on 
both test scores, that population density exerts 
positive influences on math SAT scores, and public 
school spending positively influences verbal SAT 
scores. Secular school enrollments exert negative 
effects on verbal, but not math, test scores thus 
indicating that areas with greater private (secular) 
school enrollment also have relatively lower public 
school performance. Charter enrollments and per­
centages of students who are English-learners exert 
hypothesized negative influences on both test scores. 
Table 5 displays results for all private school 
enrollments. The first-stage regression indicates that 
enrollments are positively influenced by income and 
shares of students of Asian descent and negatively 
related to percent of students taking tests. Second-
stage regressions show that income and population 
density exerts positive influences on both test scores. 
Private school enrollments exert negative effects on 
both test scores thus indicating that areas with greater 
private school enrollment also have relatively lower 
public school performance. Charter enrollments exert 
negative influences on math SAT scores and percen­
tages of students who are English-learners exert 
hypothesized negative influences on both test scores. 
VI. Discussion of Test Results 
First-stage estimations of private school enrollments 
indicate positive influences from income thus suggest­
ing that vouchers would elicit positive responses by 
parents seeking greater private school choice to the 
extent that tuition is subsidized. Asian enrollments in 
public schools positively influence enrollments of 
Catholic, secular and all private schools. Public 
school spending positively influences Catholic and 
Table 6. Summary of estimated coefficients on private 
school enrollments 
Catholic Religious Secular 
Total 
private 
Verbal SAT 
Math SAT 
�10.7* 
�4.3 *** 
�14.8** 
�7.8 *** 
�27.4 ** 
�10.3 
�10.3 ** 
�5.0 *** 
Note: *, ** and ***significant (two-tailed test) at 1, 5 and 
10% levels, respectively 
secular enrollments, which suggest that public spend­
ing expansion by itself would not lead to higher 
public school performance has reflected by higher 
public enrollments. Public school spending does not 
exert significant influences on religious or total 
private enrollments. Greater availability of charters, 
as measured by percentage of all students served by 
charter schools, only exerts a significant negative 
effect on Catholic enrollments. Second-stage estima­
tions indicate that five factors contribute significantly 
to public school test scores: income (positive), 
population density (positive), private enrollments 
(negative), charter enrollments (negative) and 
English-fluency (negative). 
Table 6 compares estimated coefficients of influ­
ences on public test scores by type of private 
schooling. Two general conclusions are drawn. One, 
effects from private enrollments on (public school) 
verbal SATs are roughly 50% larger than on math 
SATs. This difference may suggest that parents who 
focus on verbal skills exit public schools more often 
than those focused on math skills. Two, secular 
enrollments display largest effects on verbal public 
school test scores indicating perhaps that secular 
schools serve students with relatively high verbal test 
scores. The effect on verbal SAT scores is roughly 
larger by a factor of 2.7 when compared with all 
private schools together. This difference is consistent 
with the view that secular schools prepare students 
for entry into elite universities. Interestingly, the 
estimated coefficient of the effect of secular enroll­
ments on public math SAT scores is not significantly 
different from zero, and this is the only coefficient in 
the table that is not statistically significant. However, 
it should also be noted that the effects of the other 
three private enrollments on math SAT scores are 
only significant at the 10% level thus indicating that 
overall effects of private enrollments on math SAT 
scores are not particularly strong when compared to 
those exerted on verbal SAT scores. 
Effects of private enrollments on public test scores 
are quite impressive when evaluated at average SAT 
scores. For example, a 10% increase in (combined) 
private enrollments exerts a 20% fall � a 103.4 point 
drop from 503 to 399.6 – in public verbal SAT test 
scores. A 10% increase in (combined) private 
enrollments exerts a 10% fall – a 50.5 point drop 
from 515 to 464.5 – in public math SAT test scores. 
VII. Conclusion 
The evidence indicates that public school test scores 
are inversely related to private enrollments thus 
supporting the view that private enrollments partly 
reflect exiting from public schools due to poor 
academic performance. A 10% increase in private 
enrollments is estimated to exert a 20% fall in verbal 
SAT scores and a 10% fall in math test scores of 
public schools. The evidence therefore indicates that, 
after controlling for other important factors, public 
schools exhibit higher test scores in communities with 
relatively low private enrollments. The evidence also 
indicates that charter school enrollments are exerting 
negative influences on public test scores thus reinfor­
cing the evidence from private schools that suggests 
that traditional public schools are perceived as 
inferior. 
Results should be interpreted with caution. It is 
inappropriate to simply project these empirical results 
to the future because estimates are drawn from data 
on current enrollments that are unlikely to resemble 
future populations. Although more parents may 
choose private schooling following expanded private 
school choice, it remains unclear if they would exhibit 
similar commitments to private education and bear 
children with similar academic capabilities. It remains 
unclear what marginal effect a new batch of private 
enrollments would exert on test scores of public 
schools and it is unlikely that effects would approach 
those reported in this article. 
It is also probably inappropriate to conclude that 
private school choice reform would lead to perma­
nent further erosion of public school performance 
based on our empirical evidence because long-term 
effects on performance critically depend on how 
public schools react to heightened private school 
competition. Proponents of school choice predict 
changes that arise from the competitive model – i.e. 
exiting to private schools is a short-term phenomenon 
that fades as public schools improve performance. 
However, another scenario is that public schools 
somehow fail to stem student flight when, for 
example, public schools do not view student flight 
as much of a threat – financially or otherwise – to 
their existence, especially given low probabilities that 
public schools will be shut-down in the process. 
Private school choice reform that expands private 
enrollments to critical competitive thresholds may be 
required before improvements in public schools may 
be detected.18 Some public schools may also find it 
very difficult to improve performance, given that 
constraints imposed by school boards, teacher unions 
or falling peer group quality may hinder improve­
ment efforts despite growing threats from private 
schools. Empirical examination of these dynamics 
requires a longer time period and data sets that 
include significant changes in private school choice 
such as sizable vouchers. 
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